



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 MAR 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR TO THE DCI FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ATTN: Chief, Production Assessment
Improvement Division

SUBJECT: Systemic Problems in Intelligence Analysis on
the Soviet Union

1. We wholeheartedly approve of the objectives of the IC Staff's paper "Systemic Problems in Intelligence Analysis on the Soviet Union," dated 11 February 1977. We also find ourselves in close general agreement with the analysis and the conclusions of that paper.
2. It is of special importance to review our efforts on Soviet intelligence at a time resources are declining and requirements, quite properly, are increasing on such non-Soviet intelligence issues as international economics, energy problems, narcotics traffic, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, North-South relations, etc.
3. Even though many perceive more imminent threats to US interests from other directions, the IC Staff's paper accurately points out the increasing care, precision, and depth-of-analysis that must be given to assessments of Soviet affairs. The continuing need to avoid conflict with the USSR and to monitor actual and incipient arms-control agreements, as well as the increasing subtlety of Soviet moves on the world scene, are among the factors that highlight the ever-more-difficult Soviet intelligence problem.
4. We should work to overcome current deficiencies and to improve our individual and collective capabilities. In this era, this won't be easy; as the paper points out, "the improvements we have in mind simply will not be adequate unless backed by money and people."
5. Current deficiencies in data base utilization can and should be overcome, but the greater problem lies in the area of improving analysis. The Community should have more and better-qualified people involved in the problem of Soviet affairs, particularly in the estimative area. We should be able to afford Soviet specialists the luxury of more time devoted to study and analysis and to the development of more mature judgments on the issues.

We take very much to heart the IC Staff's comment that "the senior personnel who most influence the content of national estimates do not have sufficient time to become or remain familiar with the extensive body of material that is currently available on the Soviet Union."

6. Some of the specific aspects of the problem are very hard to deal with. For example:

- How to improve the balance between current reporting, and deep analysis in view of the urgency of consumer interest in the former?

- How to make NIEs more relevant to user's needs, when as the IC staff points out, there is great disparity in those needs and some consumers are far from sure of what they want from an intelligence estimate?

7. We welcome the IC Staff's addressal of the problem of Intelligence Analysis on the Soviet Union and generally concur in its assessment. We would approve adoption of Alternative 2 (as presented in the Attachment to the IC Staff Memo). The matter certainly merits NFIB attention and will require PRC (CFI) support if any significant measures are to be taken to correct existing deficiencies.



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Director, UIN
Acting Deputy Director
for Estimates